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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
GENTRY GAMBLE,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
DANIEL R. LARSEN and
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Appeal No. 970454-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann, (1953
as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
a.

Issue I:

Should the Court approve the concept of

"open adoption" including postadoption visitation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard.

Alvarez

v. Galetakaf 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
b.

Issue 2: Should the trial court take evidence and

consider whether postadoption visitation is permitted in
this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision

STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard,

Alvarez

v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
c.

Issue 3: Did the parties agree upon postadoption

visitation and should that agreement be specifically
enforced?
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard.

Alvarez

v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
d.

Issue 4: Did the Plaintiff state a cause of action

as an indepenent action under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to set aside the Decree of Adoption based
upon fraud, misrepresentation and mistake?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard.

Alvarez

v. Galetaka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
e.

Issue 5: Did the District Court lack jurisdiction

to consider this matter in light of the Juvenile Court
filings prior to the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss?
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This is an issue of law and this
Court should give no deference to the trial court decision
and review it pursuant to a correctness standard.
v. Galetaka. 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
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Alvarez

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Statutes;
i.

§78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

ii.

§78-3(a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

iii.

§78-30-1.5, Utah Code Ann. (1990).

iv.

Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration.

v.

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case Law;
i.

Alvarez v. Galetaka. 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).

ii.

Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).

iii. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
iv.

In Re Adoption of Childrenf etc., 406 A.2d 986
(N.J. 1979).

v.

In Re Dana Marie E.f 429 NYS.2d 340 (N.Y. 1985)

vi.

In the Interest of S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.
1995).

vii. In the Matter of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway

Navaho Nation, 732 p.2d 962 (Utah 1986), F N . 11
viii. MJChaud y, Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988).
ix.

Morse v. Daley. 704 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 1985).

x.

Shaw V. Pilcher, 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959).

xi.

Spells y, Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977).

xii. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
xiii. St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).
xiv.

State of Utah In the Interest of J.W.F. Petition

3

of Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990).
xv.

Sturrup v. Manhanf 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974).

xvi. Workman v. Workmanf 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
The Plaintiff is the natural father of Trevor B. Wheeler-

Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler-Gamble.

Mr. Gamble consented to the

step-parent adoption of his two sons subject to conditions,
including postadoption visitation.

The parties complied with

postadoption visitation for twenty-two (22) months until the
children reported abuse by the Defendants.

Apparently, the

Defendants blame the Plaintiff for that report and have refused
any visitation or contact between Mr. Gamble and the children.
The Plaintiff's action seeks: (1) postadoption visitation;
(2) the specific performance of the parties1 agreement for
postadoption visitation; and, (3) in the alternative, an order
setting aside the Decree pursuant to the Plaintiff's independent
action under Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based upon
fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake.
Prior to the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Plaintiff commenced Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights in
the Juvenile Court.

The trial court denied the Plaintiff's

Motion to Certify the Case to Juvenile Court and granted the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)
essentially finding that the Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue

4

any relief after his Consent to Adoption was given and the
adoption granted.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

every cause of action of the Plaintiff (including the Plaintiff's
cause of action for specific performance which was sought by way
of amendment to the Complaint.

The Petitioner has pending in the

Juvenile Court two Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights as to
the subject children.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order on June 27, 1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Gentry Gamble is the natural father of Trevor B.

Wheeler-Gamble (hereinafter "Trevor"), born February 10, 1987;
and Baron G. Wheeler- Gamble (hereinafter "Baron"), born July 24,
1985. Amended Complaint (A.C.), p. 1, f3.
2.

The Plaintiff and Defendant Catherine Wheeler were

husband and wife, which marriage was dissolved by Decree of
Divorce in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, dated on or about April 14, 1989,

Catherine Wheeler v» Gentry gamble, civil No. 884903729DA. A . C ,
p. 1, f4.
3.

In that Divorce Decree, Catherine Wheeler was awarded

the permanent care, custody and control of the children, Baron
and Trevor, subject to the reasonable rights of visitation as
5

particularly described therein in favor of Gentry Gamble,

A.C.,

p. 2, f5.
4.

The Defendants married on March 1, 1991.

A.C., p. 2,

5.

Due to circumstances beyond the control of the

17.

Plaintiff he became in arrears on child support payments.

The

arrears resulted from the failure of the Plaintiff's business and
a coincident illness which rendered him insolvent in 1993.

A.C.,

p. 2, f8.
6.

Following the Defendants' marriage, the Defendant

Daniel R. Larsen petitioned the Court to adopt Baron and Trevor
by way of a Petition, dated February 24, 1995.
7.

A.C., p. 2, 110.

The Defendants approached Gentry Gamble to obtain his

consent as the natural father of Baron and Trevor for their
adoption by Defendant Daniel Larsen, and in the course of
negotiations regarding that request, Gentry Gamble, based upon
the written representations, promises and in consideration of the
parties' agreement, granted his consent to the adoption and
executed a Consent which was filed with the Court.

Based upon

the Consent, the Petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor and
Baron was granted on or about April 27, 1995.
8.

A.C., p. 2, 111.

Prior to Gentry Gamble's Consent for the adoption, the

Defendants agreed, in writing, individually and through their
agent, for Gentry Gamble to maintain the present visitation
schedule with Trevor and Baron, subsequent to the adoption.

6

See

letter of Kevin J. Fife, Esquire, dated March 8, 1995, marked
Exhibit "A", Addendum.
9.

A.C., p. 3, fl2.

The agreement of the parties1, furthermore, stated that

the two minor children would be known as the surname "WheelerGamble".
10.

A.C., p. 1, f4.
The postadoption visitation schedule was defined by the

Decree of Divorce and included alternating weekend visitation,
extended visitation as well as visitation on holidays, during the
mid-week, and at other agreed upon times. A.C., p. 3, fl3.
11.

As part of the parties1 bargain and agreement, the

Defendants agreed to satisfy any judgment or claim they had for
child support arrearages. A.C., p. 3, fl4.
12.

Prior to the parties' agreement and prior to the Decree

of Adoption based upon Plaintiff's consent, the Defendants had
threatened Gentry Gamble with civil prosecution for failure to
pay his child support, and criminal prosecution as well.

A.C.,

p. 3 fl5.
13.

Since the granting of the Decree of Divorce, the

parties had abided by their agreement, that is:
i.

the Defendants had provided for and allowed Gentry

Gamble to continue to exercise the visitation schedule that
the Defendants had adopted;
ii.

the Defendants did execute a Satisfaction of

Judgment as to child support arrearages and claims; and,
iii. the minor children, since the adoption, have been
known by the name "Wheeler-Gamble".
7

A.C., p. 4, fl6.

14.

Prior to and since the Decree of Adoption, the

relationship between the Plaintiff and his sons, has continued,
and has, in fact, become more mature and meaningful.

In spite of

the Decree of Adoption, Baron and Trevor continue to look to the
Plaintiff as their father and the emotional parent/child bond
between them has continued and has not been altered.

A.C., p. 4,

117.
15.

Consistent with the Defendants' agreement, and their

practice of visitation since the Decree of Adoption, the
Plaintiff and his sons have continued to enjoy visitation,
holidays, Father's Day, as well as numerous family celebrations
and experiences, all of which are consistent with the Defendants'
agreement and the parent/child bond and relationship which
persists between the Plaintiff and the children. A.C., p. 4, fl8.
16.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to

inform the adoption court of their agreement with the Plaintiff
for ongoing visitation rights with the children at the time of
the granting of the Petition for Adoption.
17.

A.C., p. 4, ^[19.

On or about the 19th day of January, 1997, the

Defendants arbitrarily, without just cause, and contrary to the
acknowledged best interest of Trevor and Baron, unilaterally
terminated the Plaintiff's visitation with those children. A.C.,
p. 4, 520.
18.

The children have been forbidden to see or communicate

with the Plaintiff. A.C., p. 5, f21.
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19.

The children have been instructed by the Defendants to

ignore the Plaintiff and have been threatened with discipline in
the event that they disobey the Defendants in this regard.

A.C,

p. 5, 523.
20.

In spite of the informal efforts of the Plaintiff to

continue to visit with the children as the parties agreed and
have allowed for nearly two years since the adoption, the
Defendants have refused.
21.

A . C , p. 5, f24.

As a result of the Defendants' actions, the children

have been denied the ongoing comfort, counsel and benefits of
their relationship with their father. A . C , p. 5, f25.
22.

At the time the Plaintiff executed his Consent the

Defendants represented to him that he would continue to maintain
the present visitation schedule with his sons.

The Plaintiff

relied upon that representation at the time he executed the
Consent to adoption.
to the Plaintiff.

The Defendants' representation was critical

The Defendants knew full well, at that time,

that they had no intention of granting the Plaintiff visitation
rights and would, at the slightest provocation, unilaterally
assert their technical rights under the Decree of Adoption to
deny the Plaintiff any further visitation or any contact
whatsoever with the children.

Had the Plaintiff known the truth

of the Defendants' representation (that they maintained the right
to unilaterally terminate the visitation privileges of the
Plaintiff), he would never had executed the Consent, nor
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permitted the adoption to proceed without his objection.

A.C.,

P. 6, f29.
23.

The Defendants induced the Plaintiff to give his

consent to the adoption of his sons based upon the foregoing
promises which are contrary to the representations made to the
adoption court, which were relied upon by the court, for the
granting of the Decree of Adoption. A.C., p. 7, f31.
24.

The Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss his cause of action

for termination of parental rights set forth in the District
Court Complaint.

Prior to dismissal of the District Court action

by the Judge, the Plaintiff had commenced a Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights in the Third District Juvenile
Court in and for Salt Lake County, In Re Interest of Trevor B.
Wheeler-Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler-Gambler Case Nos. 933163 and
933164.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF "OPEN
ADOPTION". INCLUDING POSTADOPTION VISITATION BY A
NATURAL PARENT IN A STEP-PARENT ADOPTION.
The trend is to approve the concept of open adoption.

Open

adoption has been approved in other states even where there is no
specific statutory allowance for the concept.

Open adoption has

been tacitly approved by the Utah Supreme Court.

Open adoption

is practised throughout the state as a practical matter.
Open adoption is based upon the best interests of the
children, not "parental rights".

Open adoption may be based upon

the agreement of the parties, or an independent finding of the
10

best interests of the children.

In any case, it is dependent

upon the best interests of the children.
II.

POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOPLP BE PERMITTED IN
THIS CASE,
The trial court determined that the Plaintiff had no

standing to pursue postadoption visitation.

The court concluded

that the Consent and the Adoption Decree terminated all parental
rights.

However, the parties had agreed on postadoption

visitation.

The expectation of postadoption visitation was a

condition of the Plaintiff's consent.

The visitation actually

took place for twenty-two (22) months until it was arbitrarily
terminated by the Defendants.

The children have and continue to

enjoy a parental bond with the Plaintiff.

The visitation has

been in their best interests and the abrupt termination of
visitation is contrary to the children's best interests.
If the court approves of the concept of "open adoption", the
Plaintiff should enjoy postadoption visitation in this case.
Consistent with the best interests of the children, the case
should be remanded for those factual determinations.
III.

THE ENTIRE CASE SHOPLP HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO THE
JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF COMMENCED HIS
PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS,
Once the Plaintiff had commenced Petitions to Terminate

Parental Rights in the Juvenile Court, this matter should have
been referred to the Juvenile Court for determination.
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IV.

THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD,
Inasmuch as the Defendants did not divulge to the court the

existence of their agreement for postadoption visitation, and the
other conditions or inducements associated with the Plaintiff's
consent, there is "fraud upon the court". Additionally, the
Plaintiff relied upon the representations of the Defendants to
the effect that he would enjoy a right to postadoption
visitation.

All along the Defendants intended that they would

have the discretion to interrupt postadoption visitation and
contact in their discretion.

Had the Plaintiff known of that

intention, he would have never given his consent.

The

independent action under Rule 60(b) should go forward.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT 8BQULP PERMIT THE PRACTICE OF
"OPEN ADOPTION". INCLUDING POSTADOPTION
VISITATION BY A NATURAL PARENT IN A STEPPARENT ADOPTION,
The trial court granted the Defendants1 Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss.

The Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint seeks an

order continuing the parties1 practice of postadoption
visitation, among other things.1
1

At the hearing on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, the court
considered the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint to state
a cause of action for specific performance and breach of
contract. However, the court concluded that the new cause of
action should also be dismissed. The Amended Complaint also
eliminated the Plaintiff's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.
The Plaintiff filed a Petition as to both children, separately,
in the Third District Juvenile Court prior to a hearing on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
12

In so doing, the court relied upon the Decree of Adoption
signed by the District Judge and stated, "In light of Judge
Frederick's termination of parental rights with these children,
Plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995."
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, f7, Conclusions
of Law.)
"When reviewing a trial court's grant of a
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 'we accept
the factual allegations in the Complaint as
true and consider them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in a light
most favorable to the Plaintiff.
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a question of law, we give the
trial court's ruling no deference and review
it under a correctness standard.'" Alvarez
Vt GaletaRa, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997),

quoting stt Benedict's Devi Cof v, Stt
Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah
1991).
The effect and reasoning of the trial court's decision would
bar the possibility of an open adoption.
". . . A fundamental concept of an open
adoption is to allow some communication
between adoptive and natural parents, and
when appropriate, to permit communication
between the natural parent and the child as
the child grows up. . ." In the Matter of

the AdoptiQn of Jeremiah HallQway, NavahQ
Nation, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), F.N. 11.
This concept includes the potential for postadoption
visitation by the parent who consents to the adoption.
Interest of S.A.H.. 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1995).

13

In the

The Court's conclusion in this case was that under no
circumstances could the Court permit an open adoption and
postadoption visitation when a standard consent has been signed
by the natural parent and an adoption decree entered.

This is in

spite of the following facts and inferences which are supported
by the record:
i.

The Plaintiff's Consent for Adoption was

conditioned upon the promise of continuing visitation with
his two sons;
ii.

The children's best interests would be served by

continued visitation;
iii. Subsequent to the adoption, visitation continued
as agreed for some twenty-two (22) months;
iv.

The minor children have maintained their

parent/child relationship and bond with the Plaintiff since
the adoption.
v.

The children have continued to interact with the

Plaintiff as their father by engaging in traditional
Father's Day visits and activities, for instance.
vi.

The Defendants breached their agreement with the

Plaintiff when they unilaterally, and without cause,
terminated any contact whatsoever between the Plaintiff and
the children (coincident with the children's reporting of
abuse to their school principal).
vii. The Plaintiff relied upon the representations of
the Defendants regarding postadoption contact and
14

visitation, and had he known the truth of the Defendant's
intentions (to terminate visitation and contact at their
will), the Plaintiff would never have consented to the
adoption.
viii. The Judge who granted the adoption was unaware of
the parties' agreement and the inducements associated with
the Plaintiff's consent.
In appropriate cases, the trend is to approve open
adoptions.
"Three trends appear in the adoption area moves toward earlier termination of parental
rights so that children can be adopted, a
willingness to allow non-married partners to
adopt their partner's child, and an increased
willingness by court's to consider open
adoptions." L.D. Elrod and R.G. Spector, A

Review of the Year in Family Law; of welfare
Reformf Child Support and Relocation, at p.
775, Family Law Quarterly, Winter, 1997.
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has shown an inclination to
look favorably upon the concept of open adoption.

In the case of

In the Matter of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway, Navaho
Nation, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), the court considered whether
Utah Courts had jurisdiction over a full blooded Navaho enrolled
in the Navaho tribe.

The court concluded that the Utah State

courts did not have jurisdiction.
the child to his mother.

This called for the return of

The court was obviously concerned about

the relationship of the child and the prospective adoptive
parents.

The child had lived with the prospective adoptive

parents for several years prior to the intervention of the Navaho
Nation in the adoption proceedings.
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In that case, the court cited, with approval, the concept of
"open adoption".

The court could not enforce open adoption

because Utah courts lacked jurisdiction in that matter.

Justice

Zimmerman stated:
"11. An innovative approach to adoption,
called an open adoption, is gaining increased
recognition among professionals in the
adoption field and may be suited to this
case. A fundamental concept of an open
adoption is to allow some communication
between adoptive and natural parents and,
when appropriate, to permit communication
between the natural parent and the child as
the child grows up. See generally S. Arms To
Love and Let QQ (1973). This approach
presents some creative possibilities in the
instant case: an arrangement might be reached
which would allow Jeremiah to remain with his
adoptive parents but also would permit the
tribe to teach the child about his Indian
heritage. We make this statement as an
observation only. Recognizing that the
matter is not ours to decide."
The best interests of the child is always the overriding
concern in an adoption case. This principle has been adopted by
statute in Utah:
"Legislative Intent. It is the intent and
desire of the legislature that in every
adoption the best interest of the child
should govern and be of foremost concern in
the court's determination." § 78-30-1.5, Utah
Code Ann- (1990).
Consistent with that goal, courts have found that open
adoption is appropriate in some cases, though not in all cases.
"The practice of permitting postadoption
visitation by the natural parents of adopted
children may benefit certain children by
protecting them from the psychological harm
that may result from the complete severance
of the former family ties, and by allowing
adoptions to take place when natural parents
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are unwilling to lose all contact with their
children, but would otherwise favor the
adoption." Annotation: Postadoption
Visitation by Natural Parent "Open
adoptions"r 78 A.L.R. 4th 218 at 223.
See also, Anadio and Deutsch. Open adoption: Allowing
Adopted Children to 'Stay in Touch1 with Blood Relatives, 22 J.
Family Law 59 (1984) and Nathan, "Visitation After Adoption: In
the Best Interests of the Children", 59 NYU L. R. 633 (June
1984).
Additionally, courts which have allowed open adoption
without the benefit of statutes which specifically allow
postadoption contact:
"Without expressly addressing the issue of
postadoption visitation, adoption statutes
generally establish a vehicle for terminating
the legal relationship between the natural
parents and their children, and for giving
the adoptive parents full custody rights of
the same nature and scope of those of a
natural parent. . . Thus, courts deciding
whether to permit postadoption visitation by
a natural parent must frequently reach a
decision without the benefit of explicit

statutory guidance." Annotation;
Adoptions, supra at 224.

Open

Therefore, Courts have approved the concept of open adoption
and postadoption visitation for a natural parent when it will
promote the best interests of the adopted child.

Morse v. Daley,

704 p.2d 1087 (Nev. 1985), and Re Adoption of Children, etc, 406
A.2d 986 (N.J. 1979) (here the New Jersey court allowed
visitation by the natural father where the natural father had
enjoyed a viable relationship with the adopted children) and In
Re Dana Marie E.r 429 NYS.2d 340 (N.Y. 1985) (where the court
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followed the view that a child's best interest may require an
order granting postadoption visitation to a natural parent and
her twelve year old daughter.

In part, the court relied upon

legal commentary concluding that continued postadoption contact
with the natural parent would, in certain circumstances, help a
child to become better adjusted emotionally.)
Other jurisdictions have approved postadoption visitation
where the consent for adoption was conditioned upon such right,

in in Re Adoption of Children, e t c , supra, the court held that
it was proper to allow postadoption visitation by a natural
father where his consent to the adoption was on the condition
that the court would preserve the independent enforceable right
of the daughters1 at their sole and exclusive option, to visit
him, and concluded that such an arrangement was in their best
interest.

In so doing, the New Jersey court recognized the fact

that many adult adoptees have a psychological need to know the
facts concerning their parentage and concluded that a certain
similar psychological need must be recognized where a child
already knows and have a viable relationship with a natural
parent who consents to a step-parent's adoption.
Generally, in determining whether or not an open adoption
should be allowed together with postadoption visitation, courts
have looked to the following considerations:
i.

the nature of the relationship between the natural

parent and the adopted children;
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ii

whether there was an agreement for postadoption

visitation;
iii. whether the adopted child would be harmed by a
total severance of the relationship with the natural parent;
iv.

whether the consent for adoption was conditional;

v.

whether the adoption is a step-parent adoption;

vi.

any facts which would weigh against postadoption

visitation and contact; and,
vii. generally, whether the postadoption visitation and
contact would be in the best interests of the child or
children.
All of the above considerations are fact sensitive.

They

call upon the finder of fact to exercise discretion and wisdom.
Where the facts would suggest that an open adoption is favorable,
a motion to dismiss should be denied.
POINT II.
POSTADOPTION VISITATION SHOULD BE PERMITTED
IN THIS CASE,
In granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the trial
court found that the Plaintiff had no standing.

Presumably this

is due to the legal effect of the Plaintiff's consent for
adoption and the Decree of Adoption.

However, Utah has permitted

visitation between children and third parties where those third
parties have no "legal" right to such a privilege.

Visitation

rights have been permitted when the best interests of the
children had been served.

In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64

(Utah 1978), the Utah court permitted step-father visitation in
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the absence of an adoption by the step-father, where the
visitation would serve the best interests of the child•

See

also, Workman v. Workman. 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972); Sturrup v.
Manhan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974), and Spells v. Spells, 378
A.2d 879 (Pa. 1977).
In State of Utah In the Interest of J.W.F. Petition of
Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), the Utah court held that a
step-parent (whether or not they stood "in local parentis"), was
to be treated as a relative and entitled to a hearing as to
whether it is in the child's best interest to be awarded custody
or visitation rights.

The court reasoned:

"We conclude that several factors may justify
granting a person standing to petition for
custody of a child. As the court of appeals
noted, the legally enforceable financial
obligations that a person had toward a child
may suffice to give that person standing to
seek custody. However, the grant of standing
cannot be determined solely by reference to
legal support obligations. Equally important
is the person's status or relationship to the
child even if the person has no legal duty of
support to a child, that person's legal
relationship to the child may suffice for
standing. Examples include close relatives,
who, although lacking a duty of support, may
be perceived by reason of that relationship
to have the child's best interests at heart.
Such a relationship would seem to warrant a
grant of standing. (Footnote 4)
(Footnote 4) In addition, it is conceivable
that persons who are not related by blood or
marriage, although not presumptively entitled
to standing, could show that had a
relationship with the child that would
warrant a grant of standing. We have no such
situation before us today." In Re J.W.F,
supra.
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More recently, a natural mother's girlfriend has been
awarded visitation rights, and the natural mother's Motion to
Dismiss that action for lack of standing was denied in the case
of A.I, v. C D . r Case No. 940902124, decided by Judge Leslie A.
Lewis, Third District Court, State of Utah.

While the case is

not binding authority on this court, it is consistent with a
practice which is not at all unusual in Utah courts, and
particularly Juvenile courts, to acknowledge and permit
visitation by third parties, including grandparents, where
adoption takes place following the termination of parental rights
or the death of natural parents.

See: In the Matter of AA

Berlin, Case No. 943900233 in the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah (where grandmother
was permitted ongoing contact and standard visitation rights as
part of the adoption decree where a child's aunt adopted
following the death of the natural mother).
In this case, the considerations set forth above suggest
that ongoing visitation by the Plaintiff should be permitted.
Mr. Gamble did not consent to the adoption of his sons because of
a deteriorated or destroyed parent/child relationship.

Rather,

the relationship is sound and has continued as an appropriate
parent/child relationship even after the adoption.

By all

indications, the continued relationship between the children and
Mr. Gamble would be beneficial to them.
suggestion on the record to the contrary.
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In fact, there is no

Mr. Gamble's consent was conditional and based upon the
written promise of ongoing visitation.

Had it not been for that

promise, Mr. Gamble would not have consented to the adoption.

In

similar cases, other courts have specifically enforced such an
agreement.

See Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988).

In the Michaud case, the court enforced an open adoption and
visitation agreement between the natural mother and the adoptive
parents so long as the child's best interests were the
determinative criteria.

In that case the natural mother had

consented to the adoption and was allowed to specifically perform
the agreement requiring postadoption visitation.

The court

specifically rejected the contention that the enforcement of the
agreement would somehow violate the state's adoption statutes.
Consistent with the parties' agreement, Mr. Gamble was
permitted visitation for twenty-two (22) months following the
adoption.

In contract terms, such behavior would constitute part

performance of the parties' contract.

It certainly created a

reasonable expectation on the part of the children for ongoing
contact with the person they still view as their natural father.
POINT III.
THE ENTIRE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO
THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF
COMMENCED HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL
RISHT&L

The Complaint originally stated a cause of action for
termination of parental rights based upon the abuse and neglect
of the subject children.

This cause of action was in addition to

the Plaintiff's claim for postadoption visitation, to set aside
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the Decree, and for the specific performance of the parties1
visitation contract.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the

termination cause of action.

The Plaintiff agreed to dismiss

that cause of action and moved to amend the Complaint to state
the cause of action for specific performance.
The Plaintiff then filed two Petitions to Terminate Parental
Rights as to each of the subject children.

See Addendum F, the

"Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights", Gentry
Gamble, Petitioner, Case Nos. 933163 and 933164.2

Rule 4-902, Code of Judicial Administration, states as
follows:
"(1) In district coutt cases where there is a
question concerning the support, custody or
visitation of a child and a petition
concerning abuse, dependency or neglect of
the same child has been filed in juvenile
court, the district court shall certify the
question of support, custody or visitation to
the juvenile court for determination.
(4) When the district court certifies
questions of support, custody or visitation,
the clerk of the district court shall
transmit the entire case file to the clerk of
the juvenile court who shall refer to the
presiding judge for assignment."
Furthermore, §78-3(a)-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
also requires the certification of such cases to Juvenile Court
in addition to granting the District Court discretion to certify
such cases "at any time" whether an action is pending in the
Juvenile Court or not.

2

The Petition was originally filed on May 8, 1997 and later
amended.
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POINT IV.
THE PLAINTIFF STATED AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD,
The Plaintiff brought his action pursuant to Rule 60(b),
Utah Rules Qf Civil Procedure as an independent action seeking to
set aside the Decree of Divorce.

The Defendants moved to dismiss

this action claiming that it was not timely, or that it was not
within the three month provision of Rule 60(b).

However, there

is no three month time limit on an independent action pursuant to
Rule 60(b).

See St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).

Rule 60(b), in relevant parts, states as follows:
"This Rule does not limit the power of the
court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules, or by an
independent action."
An independent action is the proper way to attack an
adoption decree which is allegedly procured based upon fraud.
Shaw v. Pilcher. 341 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1959).

Additionally,

fraud, accident and mistake are grounds for relief by way of
independent action.

The Utah Supreme Court, in Gillmore v.

Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993), elaborated on the holding in
St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra, and stated:
"This case [St. Pierre] did not state that an
independent action will only lie for such
claims or that such an action is no longer
viable to remedy errors based on mutual
mistakes of fact in legal descriptions.
Moreover, we cited 11 Charles A. Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure. §2868, at 239-40 (1973) which
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specifically states that an independent
action in equity, also will lie on the basis
of accident or of mistake."
The St, Pierre case is particularly instructive.

That case

involved allegations of "fraud upon the court" which were based
upon claims that the plaintiff had assented to a settlement
agreement as a result of harassment, threats, abuse, and
intimidation by her ex-husband.
In this case, the Plaintiff asserts that the consent for
adoption was based upon: (1) the contract and promise for
continued visitation rights; (2) because the Defendants had
threatened legal proceedings and criminal proceedings because of
the Plaintiff's failure to pay child support due to circumstances
beyond his control; and, (3) the inducement to forgive child
support arrearages.

In essence, the Defendants took advantage of

the Plaintiff's dire financial straights and emotional ill
health.
The letter from Mr. Larsen's attorney referencing the
agreement for ongoing visitation was never divulged to the Court.
Had the agreement been divulged to Judge Frederick, the adoption
would never have been granted.

Whether that information was

divulged to Judge Frederick was beyond the Plaintiff's control.
Only the Defendants decided what evidence they would give the
Judge in order to obtain the adoption.

The fact that the natural

father, who purportedly consented to the adoption, would continue
to enjoy parental rights was a pivotal fact.

Additionally the

fact that the Plaintiff had been induced to give his consent by
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virtue of the promise for ongoing visitation, and the
satisfaction of child support arrearages, would have been
relevant factors for the Court to consider in the adoption
proceeding.

The Plaintiff's Complaint states a cause of action

under St. Pierre,

The Defendants clearly withheld information

and thereby perpetrated a fraud upon the Court.
CONCLUSION
Open adoption should be approved by this Court.

As part of

an open adoption, under proper circumstances and when it is in
the best interests of the child, postadoption visitation should
be permitted.

Unless there is a statute expressly barring such

an award, it has been held permissible in other jurisdictions.
Consenting to an adoption should not, necessarily, result in a
termination of any contact between the natural parent and the
adopted child.

The adoption may effectively terminate parental

rights, but postadoption visitation derives from the child's best
interests rather than parental rights.
In this case, the parties agreed to postadoption visitation
which continued for twenty-two (22) months after the adoption.
Visitation and contact were terminated unilaterally by the
Defendants without consideration of the children's best
interests.

The children's best interests should be a factual

question resolved by the trial court.
The Plaintiff has stated an independent cause of action to
set aside the adoption decree based upon fraud.

Contrary to the

representations contained in the consent and decree, the parties
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had, in fact, agreed upon postadoption visitation.

Additionally,

the consent was procured based upon misrepresentation of the
Plaintiff's postadoption visitation and induced by promises which
were not divulged to the court.
In response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the
Plaintiff commenced a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights in
the Juvenile Court.

This case should have been certified to the

Juvenile Court for determination.
The matter should be remanded to the Juvenile Court to take
evidence and make findings of fact in regards to the best
interests of the children and whether or not postadoption
visitation should continue.

Additionally, the Plaintiff should

be entitled to pursue his claim to set aside the Decree under his
Rule 60(b) independent action.
DATED THIS

X \

day of October, 1997.
GREEN & BERRY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the

day of

October, 1997, I served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellant
upon William W. Downes, Jr., Esq., Winder & Haslam, the counsel
for Defendant/Appellee in this matter by mailing a copy by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:

175 West 200 South, Suite 4000, Salt Lake City, Utah

84110-2668,

DERICK N.'GREEN
<At
ttorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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William W. Downes, Jr. (#0907)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GENTRY GAMBLE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.
DANIEL R. LARSEN and
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Civil No. 970901796
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

The above-captioned matter came before the court on the
9th day of May, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, plaintiff appearing in person and through counsel, Frederick N.
Green, and defendants appearing in person and through counsel,
William W. Downes, Jr.

The court reviewed plaintiff's Com-

plaint, the Certified Consent of Father Giving up Rights to
Children Conceived Within Marriage and the Decree of Adoption.
Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby
enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 24, 1995, Daniel R. Larsen filed a

Petition in the Third Judicial District Court to adopt Trevor
Wheeler Gamble and Baron Wheeler Gamble, the natural children
of his spouse, Catherine J. Wheeler.

In the Matter of the

Adoption of Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble and Baron G. Wheeler
Gamble, Third District Court Case No. 952900102AD (Judge J.
Dennis Frederick).
2.

On March 20, 1995, Gentry Gamble, the childrens1

natural father, signed the Certified Consent of Father Giving
up Rights to Children Conceived Within Marriage and Waiver of
Notice,
3.

The Certified Consent provides a warning at the top

of the document as follows:
DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT READING IT. IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS WHATSOEVER, MAKE SURE YOU CONSULT
WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT. BY
SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHTS
AS A PARENT. YOU CANNOT REVOKE THE CONSENT TO YOUR
CHILDREN'S ADOPTION ONCE YOU SIGN THIS DOCUMENT.
4.

Paragraph 7 of the Certified Consent provides:

[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah eode
Ann. Section 78-30-11 (1990, as amended), he will be
released from all future parental duties toward and
all future responsibilities for the adopted children,
and have no further rights with regard to the children.
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5.

Paragraph 8 of the Certified Consent of Father

provides:
[Plaintiff] understands that from the time the final
decree of adoption is entered, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-30-9 (1990, as amended), that the
children will be adopted by the petitioner and the
children shall be regarded and treated in all
respects as the children of the petitioner and
Catherine Wheeler.
6.

Paragraph 10 of the Certified Consent of Father

provides:
[Plaintiff] has had the opportunity to consult with
and obtain the advice of an attorney of his choice.
7.

The Decree of Adoption entered on April 27, 1995 by

the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick provides, at paragraph 4:
"All rights and interests of Gentry Gamble with regard to
Trevor and Baron are hereby and forever terminated."
8.

Plaintiff's Complaint references a letter from the

law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal to plaintiff wherein
plaintiff was advised:

"You may maintain the present visita-

tion schedule with Trevor and Baron."
9.

The Complaint does not reference, nor did plaintiff

present at oral argument, any other documents to further
establish or define any ongoing visitation agreement between
the parties.
10.

Plaintiff sought leave of court to file an Amended

Verified Complaint alleging an additional cause of action
styled as "Specific Performance and Breach of Contract."
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Plaintiff alleges the existence of contractual visitation
rights that have been breached by the defendants.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court
hereby makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under principles of contract law, the language of the

Certified Consent and the Decree of Adoption is clear and
unequivocal.

Plaintiff Gentry Gamble understood and agreed to

relinquish all rights to the adopted children.
2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Adoption granted on April

27, 1995, all rights and interests of plaintiff with regard to
these children were forever terminated.
3.

When read in conjunction with the clear and unequivo-

cal language of the Certified Consent and Decree of Adoption,
the referenced letter does not create in plaintiff any legally
enforceable right with regard to the adopted children.
4.

The visitation language in the attorneyfs letter is

insufficient in light of the adoption papers to create a
contract for post-adoption visitation.

The attorney's letter

does not define the visitation schedule, explain how the
visitation schedule could be modified, provide an enforcement
mechanism or preclude the defendants from terminating the
visitation schedule.
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5.

As the natural parents of these children pursuant to

the Decree of Adoption, defendants may terminate any contact
between their children and plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking to set

aside the Decree of Adoption pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure should be dismissed with prejudice for
failing to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.
7.

Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action seeking to enforce

or establish visitation with defendants1 children should be
dismissed with prejudice.

In light of Judge Frederick's

termination of plaintiff's parental rights with these children,
plaintiff lacks standing to seek or enforce visitation rights
after the Decree of Adoption became final on April 27, 1995.
8.

Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action seeking to termi-

nate defendants' parental rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-3(a)-401, et. seq., should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

The juvenile courts of this state

have exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions.
9.

Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint should be

denied as futile since the Amended Complaint likewise fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the reasons
stated above.
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ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is

granted.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is denied,

3.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice,

DATED this

day of

, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian, Judge
Approved as to form:
GREEN & BERRY

Tderick N. Green
Attorney for Plaintiff
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COHNE
RAPPAPORT
& SEGAL
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR
SALr LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
(801)532 2666
(801) 355-1813 FAX

Mailing Address
POST OFFICE BOX 11008
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84147 0008

Bruce G Cohne
Richard A Rappapori
Roger G. Segal
Jeffrey L Sihestnm
David S Dolowitz
Vernon L Hopkmson
John T. Morgan
Keith W Meade
RayM Beck

AO. Headman, Jr
Julie A. Bryan
Erik Strtndberg
Clifford C Ross
Jeffrey R Ontt
Daniel J. Torkelson
Leslie Van Frank
Kevin J Fife
Ralph £ Chamness

March 8, 1995

Gentry Gamble
4700 South 900 East, Suite 30-146
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Re:

Adoption of Trevor and Baron

Dear Mr. Gamble:
Catherine has informed me that you have agreed to voluntarily consent to Dan's adoption
of Baron and Trevor. In accordance with your agreement, I have prepared and filed Dan
Larsen's Petition for Adoption. Under Utah law, this Petition must be served upon you or you
must agreed to accept service. It is my understanding that you have agreed to accept service and
I have prepared am Acceptance of Service for your signature.
Enclosed you will find a copy of the Petition for Adoption, a Notice of Petition of
Adoption and your Consent to Adoption. The Consent is the document you will sign to agree
to Dan's adoption of Trevor and Baron. I will make arrangements for you to sign this document
and the Acceptance of Service in front of a notary public and that notary public will return these
documents to me. I will be sending you further correspondence and calling you on the telephone
regarding this procedure, which will be handled in a confidential manner. In the interim, you
should review the Consent and take it to an attorney for his or her review if you so desire.
Once the Consent is signed, it is irrevocable.
When the adoption has become final, I will file a satisfaction of judgment regarding the
Order on Order to Show Cause previously entered against you. In addition, if any negative
credit history appears because of this judgment, we will arrange for that to be removed from
your credit report. It is my understanding that Trevor and Baron are to retain the surname
Wheeler Gamble during the period of their minority. Also, you may maintain the present
visitation schedule with Trevor and Baron. Finally, once your parental rights are terminated,
you are under no continuing obligation to provide any support for Trevor and Baron.

Gentry Gamble
March 8, 1995
Page 2

I appreciate your willingness to work with Catherine and me on this matter. If you have
any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to call me. I will be contacting you shortly
to make arrangements for the signing of your Consent and Acceptance of Service.
Very truly yours,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C-

KevirH. Fife^/
KJF:mm
Enclosures
cc:
Catherine Wheeler
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FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
GREEN & BERRY
Attorney for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building,
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

GENTRY GAMBLE

PROPOSED AMENDED
VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil NO. 970901796
DANIEL R. LARSEN AND
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant,
The Plaintiff complains of the Defendants, and each of them,
and alleges in support thereof as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
2.

The Defendants are husband and wife and are each

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Gentry Gamble is the natural father of Trevor B.

Wheeler Gamble (hereinafter "Trevor"), born February 10, 1987;
and Baron G. Wheeler Gamble (hereinafter "Baron"), born July 24,
1985.
4.

The Plaintiff and Defendant Catherine Wheeler were

husband and wife, which marriage was divorced by Decree of this

Court, dated on or about April 14, 1989, Catherine
Gentry

Gamble,

Civil No. 884903729DA.

Wheeler

v.

See Exhibit "A" attached

hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
5.

In that Divorce Decree, Catherine Wheeler was awarded

the permanent care, custody and control of the children, Baron
and Trevor, subject to the reasonable rights of visitation as
particularly described therein in favor of Gentry Gamble.
6.

The Plaintiff herein was ordered to pay $200.00 per

month, per child as and for child support.
7.

The Defendants married on March 1, 1991.

8.

Due to circumstances beyond the control of the

Plaintiff herein, he became in arrears on child support payments.
The arrears resulted from the failure of the Plaintiff's business
and a coincident illness which rendered him insolvent in 1993.
9.

In spite of this, and at all times since the granting

of the Decree of Divorce, Gentry Gamble has maintained a close
relationship with Baron and Trevor and has maintained a parental
relationship with the two children, making payments in 1994 of
$400.00 in child support plus $100.00.
10.

Following the Defendants1 marriage, the Defendant

Daniel R. Larsen petitioned the Court to adopt Baron and Trevor
by way of a Petition, dated February 24, 1995.
11.

The Defendants approached Gentry Gamble to obtain his

consent as the natural father of Baron and Trevor for their
adoption by Defendant Daniel Larsen, and in the course of
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negotiations regarding that request, Gentry Gamble, based upon
the representations, promises and in consideration of the
parties' agreement, granted his consent to the adoption and
executed a Consent which was filed with the court.

Based upon

the Consent, the Petition of Daniel R. Larsen to adopt Trevor and
Baron was granted on or about April 27, 1995.

See Decree of

Adoption, marked Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference.
12.

Prior to Gentry Gamble's Consent for the adoption, the

Defendants agreed, in writing, individually and through their
agent, for Gentry Gamble to maintain the present visitation
schedule with Trevor and Baron, subsequent to the adoption.

See

letter of Kevin J. Fife, dated March 8, 1995, marked Exhibit "C"
and attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
13.

The present visitation schedule was roughly defined by

the Decree of Divorce and included alternating weekend
visitation, extended visitation as well as visitation on
holidays, during the mid-week, and at other agreed upon times.
14.

Furthermore, as part of the parties' bargain and

agreement, the Defendants agreed to satisfy any judgment or claim
they had for child support arrearages.
15.

Prior to the parties' agreement and prior to the Decree

of Adoption based upon Plaintiff's consent, the Defendant's had
threatened Gentry Gamble with not only civil prosecution for
failure to pay his child support, but criminal liability and
prosecution as well.
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16.

Since the granting of the Decree of Divorce, the

parties had abided by their agreement, that is:
(a)

the Defendants did execute a Satisfaction of

Judgment as to child support arrearages and claims; and,
(b)

the Defendants have provided for and allowed

Gentry Gamble to continue to exercise the visitation
schedule that the Defendants had adopted.
17.

Prior to and since the Decree of Adoption, the

relationship between Gentry Gamble and his sons, has continued,
and has, in fact, become more mature and meaningful.

In spite of

the Decree of Adoption, Baron and Trevor continue to look to
Gentry as their father and the emotional parent/child bond
between them has continued and has not been altered.
18.

Consistent with the Defendants' agreement, and their

practice of visitation since the Decree of Adoption, the
Plaintiff and his sons have continued to enjoy visitation,
holidays, Father's Day, as well as numerous family celebrations
and experiences, all of which are consistent with the Defendants1
agreement and the parent/child bond and relationship which
persists between the Plaintiff and the children.
19.

On information and belief, the Plaintiff alleges that

the Defendants have failed to inform the court of their agreement
with the Plaintiff for ongoing visitation rights with the
children at the time of the granting of the Petition for
Adoption.
20.

On or about the 19th day of January, 1997, the

Defendants arbitrarily, without just cause, and contrary to the

4

acknowledged best interest of Trevor and Baron, unilaterally
terminated the Plaintiff's visitation rights with those children.
21.

The children have been forbidden to see the Plaintiff,

22.

Except for the children's chaperoned visit at the time

of the funeral of the Plaintiff's "step-son" there has been no
interaction permitted by Defendants by way of personal visits,
telephone conversations and the like.
23.

The children have been instructed by the Defendants to

ignore the Plaintiff and have been threatened with discipline in
the event that they disobey the Defendants in this regard.
24.

In spite of the informal efforts of the Plaintiff to

continue to visit with the children as the parties agreed and
have allowed for nearly two years since the adoption, the
Defendants, and each of them, have refused.
25.

As a result of the Defendants' actions, the children

have been denied the ongoing comfort, counsel and benefits of
their relationship with their father.
26.

The actions of the Defendants are contrary to the best

interests of the children, and have been undertaken without the
benefit of the Defendants' agreement or consulting with the
Plaintiff, much less any court direction or order.
27.

Unless the Court grants relief to the Plaintiff as

prayed herein, the Defendant will continue in this course of
action to the damage of the children, as well as the Plaintiff's
rights.
28.

The Defendants have threatened the Plaintiff with legal

proceedings to restrain him from any further contact with the
5

children, or the children with the Plaintiff.

However, the

Plaintiff is unaware of any action commenced by the Defendants in
this regard which would in any sense legitimize their unilateral
behavior.
29.

At the time the Plaintiff executed his Consent the

Defendants represented to him that he would continue to maintain
the present visitation schedule with his sons.

The Plaintiff

relied upon that representation at the time he executed the
Consent to adoption.
to the Plaintiff.

The Defendants1 representation was critical

The Defendants knew full well, at that time,

that they had no intention of granting the Plaintiff visitation
rights and would, at the slightest provocation, unilaterally
assert their technical rights under the Decree of Adoption to
deny the Plaintiff any further visitation or any contact
whatsoever with the children.

Had the Plaintiff known the truth

of the Defendants1 representation (that they maintained the right
to unilaterally terminate the visitation privileges of the
Plaintiff), he would never had executed the Consent, nor
permitted the adoption to proceed without his objection.

By

virtue of the foregoing, the Defendants have acted fraudulently.
30.

By failing to inform the Court of the parties'

agreement, the Defendants have committed a fraud upon the Court
and obtained a Decree of Adoption without apprising the court of
all of the relevant circumstances.
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31.

In fact, the Defendants have induced the Plaintiff to

give his consent to the adoption of his sons based upon the
foregoing promises which are contrary to the representations made
to the Court, which were relied upon by the Court, for the
granting of the Decree of Adoption.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
32.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this

reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 30.
33.

The Defendants action is fraudulent, both as to the

procurement of the Plaintiff's consent as well as the adoption
itself.
34.

As such, the Court should rescind and set aside the

Decree of Adoption referred to above pursuant to Rule 60(b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the common law of this
state.
35.

The Court's order rescinding the Decree of Adoption

should restore the Plaintiff to his full parental rights as well
as his parental obligations, which he is willing, able and
anxious to assume.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for an Order of the Court
rescinding the Decree of Adoption.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
37.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this

reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 35.
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38.

In the event that the Court does not rescind the

adoption, it would be in the best interests of the children that
the Court restore to the Plaintiff and provide formally and by
way of order for the Plaintiff's visitation rights with Trevor
and Baron.
39.

The Plaintiff's visitation rights should correspond to

the rights provided for in the Decree of Divorce referred to
above, except as may have been modified by the parties' practice,
if at all, since the granting of the Decree of Divorce.
WHEREFORE, in the alternative, the Plaintiff prays for
visitation rights with the minor children, Trevor and Baron,
consistent with the visitation privileges set forth in the
Divorce Decree between the Plaintiff and Defendant, Catherine J.
Wheeler.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Specific Performance and Breach of Contract
40.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this

reference as if fully set forth herein all of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 40.
41.

The parties agreed for ongoing visitation in

consideration of the adoption.

The Defendants have breached the

agreement by unilaterally terminating the contractual visitation
rights of the Plaintiff.
42.

The only adequate remedy available at law is that of

specific performance.
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43.

The Defendants should be ordered, per the contract of

the parties, to facilitate and permit ongoing contact and
visitation.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for an order of the court
ordering the specific performance of the parties' contract to
permit the ongoing visitation and contact between the Plaintiff
and the minor children.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendant, and each of them, as follows:
1.

That the Decree of Adoption be rescinded and set aside.

2.

That the Plaintiff be restored his parental rights and

obligations.
3.

That in the alternative the Plaintiff be restored

visitation rights pursuant to the parties1 agreement and the
equitable powers of the Court which visitation rights would be in
the best interest of the children.
4.

That the Court enter an order for the specific

performance of the parties1 contract to permit the ongoing
visitation and contact between the Plaintiff and the minor
children.
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

proper.
DATED THIS

£&

day of April, 1997.
Respectfully Submitted,
GREEN. & BERRY

7
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FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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DATED THIS

Z%

day of March, 1997

"GENTRY G
Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Gentry Gamble, the Plaintiff in the foregoing being first
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: that he has read the
foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that the matters therein
are true and correct and based upon information and belief, and
as to those, believes them to be true.

GENTRY GAM;
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
1997,
rary "PiiBlic
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake County
S t a t e of Utah

r

f

\\

My Commission E x p i r e s :
- ^

I

^ S B f m - l SaftlifaftCfty,Utofr<ni 1
My Convnitaion E » f e j
Septombtr 26, i W7
•T"-"
State of Utah
i

944 Hyland Lake D r i v e
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121

C \WPDATA\FNG\G-215-97UMCOMPLA.PLD
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration,, the attached
AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT upon the following parties by causing
to be hand delivered a true and correct copy thereof to:
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq.
Winder & Haslam
Attorneys for Defendants
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
on the 28 day of April, 1997.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 day of April,
1997.

C \WPDATA\FNG\G-215-97\AMCOMPLA PLD
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FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0)
GREEN Sc BERRY
Attorney for Plaintiff
62 2 Newhouse Building,
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

GENTRY GAMBLE

AFFIDAVIT OF GENTRY GAMBLE,
DATED APRIL 28, 1997

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil NO. 970901796
DANIEL R. LARSEN AND
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

Gentry Gamble, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I am the Plaintiff above named and have filed a

Verified Complaint.
2.

This Affidavit will supplement and augment the Verified

Complaint as follows.
3.

Since the adoption of Trevor and Baron by Daniel R.

Larsen, my relationship with Trevor and Baron has not changed.
They still look to me as their father.
4.

Our visitation has continued just as it did prior to

the adoption.

5.

The children visit with me on Father's Day.

vacation together.

We

I attend their extracurricular activities and

school functions just as I did before.

We communicate in writing

as we always have.
6.

The refusal of the Defendants to permit any contact

between the children and myself was abrupt and distressing to me.
7.

Based upon my intimate relationship with the boys, I am

sure that it is equally distressing for them.
8.

This behavior of the Defendants is consistent with the

abusive behavior that was reported to me, and others, regarding
the Defendants and how they "discipline" and limit the reasonable
activities of the children.
9.

Attached hereto and marked Exhibits "A" through " fV "

are photographs taken since the adoption, as well as
correspondence, cards, and the like that I have received from the
children, since the adoption.
DATED THIS CZ %

day of April, 1997.

GENTRY G
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Q ^ day of April,

1997

AU/REfe *

p

f ^ ^

Sta» of Utaft

!

J

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the attached
AFFIDAVIT OF GENTRY GAMBLE, DATED APRIL 28, 1997 upon the
following parties by causing to be hand delivered a true and
correct copy thereof to:
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq.
Winder & Haslam
Attorneys for Defendants
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
on the 28 day of April, 1997.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 day of April,
1997 .

N(^t^6y Publl
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
CHRSTEN ENGLAND
Notary PuWc
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GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
Attorneys for Petitioner
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JIJVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the interest of
TREVOR B. WHEELER GAMBLE, and
BARON G. WHEELER GAMBLE.

AMENDED PETITION FOR
TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Case NO. 933163, 933164

Persons under the age
of eighteen (18) years.

Judge Kimberly K. Hornak

Gentry Gamble, Petitioner herein, petitions the Court for
termination of parental rights and alleges in support thereof as
follows:
1.

Gentry Gamble resides at 944 Hyland Lake Drive,

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Trevor B. Wheeler Gamble is a male child, born February 10,

1987; and, Baron G. Wheeler Gamble is a male child, born July 24,
19853.

Both children were born in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Both children reside with Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J. Wheeler
at 3796 East Thousand Oaks Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

The Petitioner is the natural father of the minor children

who has earlier consented to their adoption by Daniel R. Larsen and
executed a consent for adoption for that adoption.

The consent for

adoption was given in partial consideration of the promise of Daniel

vr>Kfo-2\yrT^uDiTrauu>

R. Larsen and Catherine J. Wheeler for continued and reasonable
visitation between the Petitioner and the minor children which has
continued up until January, 1997.
5.

The Petitioner has maintained with the children and they

have reciprocated, the bond and relationship of parent and child.
6.

The pertinent information regarding the interested parties

is as follows:
Name

Address

Date of Birth

Gentry Gamble

944 Hyland Lake Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

09-19-57

Catherine J. Wheeler

3796 E. Thousand Oaks Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84118

10-25-59

Daniel R. Larsen

3796 E. Thousand Oaks Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84118

09-18-58

7.

At the present time, Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J.

Wheeler have custody of the minor children.
8.

The children have each reported to the Petitioner that they

have been physically abused by Wheeler and Larsen.

Furthermore, on

information and belief the same report has been made by the children
to administrators or teachers at their school.

Based thereon, and

on information and belief, Larsen and Wheeler have neglected or
abused the children which behavior renders them unfit or incompetent
pursuant to §78-3a-407, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
9.

According to the report of the children, the abuse of the

petitioners has taken the following forms:

a.

repeated hitting and striking with a man's leather

belt;

2

b.

requiring that the children chose the belt. Should the

child or children flinch, cry out or resist these beatings, then they
are punished with additional "strappings" with the belt;
c.

striking and hitting with an open hand and the back

of the hand;
d.

confinement in closed areas such as the bathroom, a

particular spot on a tile floor, or the family dog kennel, without
a pillow or blanket, to sleep on a rock/dirt floor.
e.

withholding food for up to a day at a time;

f.

demeaning and injurious verbal abuse disparaging the

children's intellectual capacity and general intelligence;
g.

being punched in the stomach and elsewhere on the

h.

hitting each child with a frying pan, on one occasion

body ;

with a cooler in the head.
10.

On one occasion, Baron has been forced to call 911 to

report what he believed to be an emergency related to abuse similar
to that set forth above.
11.

Typically, the above behavior is inflicted on the children

in a response to less than perfect performance of homework or other
school assignments, or minor infractions such as leaving a ball-point
pen on the floor to be picked up by one of the Respondents.
12.

The nature of this abuse consisting of its frequency and

lack of reasonable "justification" or explanation by the Respondents,
is sufficient to warrant the termination of parental rights.
13.

These incidents have been reported to the Division of

Family Services or Division of Human Services of the State of Utah,
3

and an investigation has been conducted.

Despite the Petitioner's

request, that investigation has not been subject to review.

On

information and belief, Daniel R. Larsen has represented to others,
including Baron's school principal or administrator, as well as
investigators and police officers, that he is the assistant attorney
general in charge of the Division of Family Service, or otherwise
occupies some position of authority or power in connection with the
Division

of

Family

Services.

The

Petitioner

is

reasonably

apprehensive that the investigation, if any, has been limited or
curtailed because of the representations of Mr. Larsen.
14.

It would be reasonable and in the best interests of the

children that their custody

or guardianship

be awarded

to the

Petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays that the Court enter an Order
terminating the parental rights of Daniel R. Larsen and Catherine J.
Wheeler as to the minor children set forth above, and that custody
or guardianship of the children be awarded to the Petitioner together
with such further and additional relief as the Court may deem proper.

DATED THIS

7

day of July, 1997.
GREEN & BERRY

Petitioner's Address:
944 Hyland Lake Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

vrnoc-215-rAAMDrrrn nx>

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING AND DELIVERY BY FACSIMILE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing AMENDED PETITION FOR TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS was faxed to the office of William W. Downes,
Jr. , at 532-3706 and was placed in the United States mail at Salt
Lake City, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on
the

<Y

day of July, 1997, addressed as follows:

iflaJy)on 10^

E*FWOO-2IJ-»7VAMDreTTlfLD

William w. Downes, Jr
WINDER & HASLEM
175 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GENTRY GAMBLE,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Civil NO, 970901796
DANIEL R. LARSEN and
CATHERINE J. WHEELER,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant/Appellee.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff and Appellant
Gentry Gamble, by and through his attorney of record, Frederick
N. Green of Green & Berry, appeals to the Court of Appeals the
final Order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian entered in this matter
on June 27, 1997, which is an Order Granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss.
DATED THIS

day of July, 1997.
GREEN

^RfeDERti2K N. GREEN

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

E \FNG\G-215-97\NOTAPPEA.PLD

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Audi BH-—L> > AO icee ,* being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served pursuant to Rule
4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the attached NOTICE
OF APPEAL to the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
William W. Downes, Jr., Esq.
Winder & Haslam
Attorneys for Defendants/Appelees
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the

*L

day of

1997,

»g//ff<L/
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi
1997.

rary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
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78-3a-104

JUDICIAL CODE

30

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
After-born child
Prima facie case
Protection of children
After-born child.
Former § 78-3a-2(16)(a)(iv), granting courts
jurisdiction to determine if a child was abused
or neglected, could apply to a child conceived
and born after another child in the home was
abused or neglected K.K. v State, 286 Utah
Adv Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
Prima facie case.
Evidence was sufficient to establish
r
, the elei
ments otr a prima rfacie case ot neglect under
r
x 7o o o,-,™ w ^ u
ii * J
former § 78-3a-2(16)(d)(iv) where appellant admitted that she caused the skull fractures and

78-3a-104.

broken bones of subject
evidence showed that the
protect the children and
subject child's siblings

child's siblings and
father was unable to
the serious abuse of
occurred only ten
m o n t h s before hig b i r t h R R y g ^
2g6 Utah
Adv Re
- P 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Protection of children.
Guardian mother had a good faith basis that
was objectively reasonable for believing in the
need to consent on behalf of her minor children
to the taping of telephone conversations with
her estranged husband in order to fulfill her
statutory mandate under former § 78-3a-2 to
act m the best interests of the children. Thomp^ ,
TT± U
son v
OOQ ^ c
C O c fr\
Dulaney, 838
F. Supp. 11535
(D. Utah
iqqo\

Jurisdiction of juvenile court — Original —
Exclusive.

(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law or
municipal ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has
violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless
of where the violation occurred, excluding traffic laws and ordinances;
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to comply
with an order of the juvenile court to pay a fine or restitution, if the order
was imposed prior to the person's 21st birthday; however, the continuing
jurisdiction is limited to causing compliance with existing orders;
(c) a minor who is abused, neglected, or dependent, as those terms are
defined in Section 78-3a-103;
(d) the determination of the custody of a minor or to appoint a guardian
of the person or other guardian of a minor who comes within the court's
jurisdiction under other provisions of this section;
(e) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance
with Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, including termination of
residual parental rights and duties;
(f) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor;
(g) a minor who, in defiance of earnest and persistent efforts on the part
of his parents and school authorities as required under Section 53A-11103, is a habitual truant from school;
(h) the judicial consent to the marriage of a minor under age 16 upon a
determination of voluntariness or where otherwise required by law,
employment, or enlistment of a minor when consent is required by law;
(i) any parent or parents of a minor committed to a secure youth
corrections facility, to order, at the discretion of the court and on the
recommendation of a secure youth corrections facility, the parent or
parents of a minor committed to a secure youth corrections facility for a
custodial term, to undergo group rehabilitation therapy under the direction of a secure youth corrections facility therapist, who has supervision of
that parent's or parents' minor, or any other therapist the court may
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direct, for a period directed by the court as recommended by a secure youth
corrections facility;
(j) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate Compact on Juveniles;
(k) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The court may
commit a child to the physical custody of a local mental health authority
or to the legal custody of the Division of Mental Health in accordance with
the procedures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 12, Part 2A. The
court may not commit a child directly to the Utah State Hospital; and
(1) the commitment of a minor in accordance with Section 62A-8-501.
(2) In addition to the provisions of Subsection (l)(a) the juvenile court has
exclusive jurisdiction over any traffic offense committed by a minor under 16
years of age and concurrent jurisdiction over the following traffic offenses
committed by a minor 16 years of age or older:
(a) Section 76-5-207, automobile homicide;
(b) Section 41-6-44, operating a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs;
(c) Section 41-6-45, reckless driving;
(d) Section 41-la-1311, unauthorized control over a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer;
(e) Section 41-la-1314, unauthorized control over a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer for an extended period of time; and
(f) Section 41-6-13.5, fleeing a peace officer.
(3) The court also has jurisdiction over traffic offenses that are part of a
single criminal episode filed in a petition that contains an offense over which
the court has jurisdiction.
(4) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over questions of custody, support,
and visitation certified to it by the district court.
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or runaway
minor who is referred to it by the Division of Child and Family Services or by
public or private agencies that contract with the division to provide services to
that minor where, despite earnest and persistent efforts by the division or
agency, the minor has demonstrated that he:
(a) is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or
school authorities to the extent that his behavior or condition endangers
his own welfare or the welfare of others; or
(b) has run away from home.
(6) This section does not restrict the right of access to the juvenile court by
private agencies or other persons.
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions relative to
cases arising under Section 78-3a-602.
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-104, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 1, § 27; 1996, ch. 234, § 15; 1996,
ch. 318, § 36.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch. 234, effective April 29, 1996, added
Subsections (l)(k) and (1)(1), making a related
stylistic change, and in Subsection (l)(f) deleted "mentally ill or" before "mentally retarded
minor" and "who comes within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section"

after "mentally retard minor."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 318, effective
April 29, 1996, inserted "Child and" in Subsection (5).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94
makes the act effective on January 31, 1996.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction with other law.
A proceeding involving the termination of a
parent's rights and obligations is not a custody
proceedmg under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), § 78-45c-l et
seq , Utah's Termination of Parental Rights
Act, § 78-3a-402 et seq , in conjunction with
statutory provisions granting exclusive original

jurisdiction to juvenile courts in termination
proceedings, provides a specific statutory
framework to follow in termination proceedmgs, and these specific statutory provisions
prevail over the more general provisions of the
Utah UCCJA, which makes no specific reference to termination proceedings. T.B. v. M.M.J.,
278 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 19^5).

78-3a-105. Concurrent jurisdiction.
(1) The district court or other court exercising jurisdiction over a violation
has concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court:
(a) when a person 18 years of age or older who is under the continuing
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section 78-3a-516 violates any
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance;
(b) in adoption proceedings where the court has previously entered an
order terminating the rights of a parent and the court finds that adoption
is in the best interests of the minor. Adoption proceedings under .this
section follow the procedure in Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption.
(2) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over petitions to modify a minor's
birth certificate if the court otherwise has jurisdiction over the minor.
(3) (a) This section does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
appoint a guardian for a minor, or to determine the support, custody, and
visitation of a minor upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of
support, custody, and visitation is incidental to the determination of a
cause in the district court.
(b; However, if a petition involving the same minor is pending in the
juvenile court or the juvenile court has previously acquired continuing
jurisdiction over the same minor, the district court may certify the
question of support, custody, and visitation to the juvenile court for
determination.
(4) A district court may at any time decline to pass upon a question of
support, custody, and visitation and may certify those questions to the juvenile
court.
(5) When a question is certified to the juvenile court under Subsection (3) or
(4), the findings and order of the juvenile court judge are the order of the
district court.
(6) (a) Where a support, custody, or visitation award has been made in a
district court in a divorce action or other proceeding and the jurisdiction of
the district court in the case is continuing, the juvenile court may acquire
jurisdiction in a case involving the same minor if the minor is dependent,
abused, or neglected or otherwise comes within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104.
(b) The juvenile court may by order change the custody, support, and
visitation rights previously ordered in the district court as necessary to
implement the order of the juvenile court for the safety and welfare of the
minor. The juvenile court order remains in effect so long as the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court continues.
(7) Upon the filing of a copy of the findings and order of the juvenile court
with the district court, the findings and order of the juvenile court are binding
on the parties to the divorce action as though entered in the district court.
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Foster parents' agreement that they will not
attempt to adopt foster child, validity and enforcement, 78 A L R 3d 770
Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor
in adoption proceedings, 84 A L R 3d 665
Equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel,
94 A L R 3 d 347
U
T \ r Spa,tUi! ° f . P r 0 B P e c t l v e p a r e n t s a s f a c "
tor, 2 A L K 4th 555
Criminal liability of one arranging for adop-

Marital or sexual relationship between parties as affecting right to adopt, 42 A L R 4th
776
Parties required in adoption proceedings, 48
A L R 4th 860
A c t l 0 n for wrongful adoption based on misrepresentation of child's mental or physical
condition or parentage, 56 A L R 4th 375
« s t e p c h l l d » for purpose8
Who
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0f
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A L R 4 t h 468
Standing of foster parent to seek termination
of rights of foster child's natural parents, 21
A L R 4 t h 535
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34
A L R 4th 167

l

**
When is illegitimate child legitimated for
Purposes of § 101(b)(1)(C) of Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U S C S § 1101(bXD(C)),
63 A L R Fed 520
Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 4, 5

78-30-1.1, Licensed child placing agency — Defined.
As used m this chapter the term "licensed child placing agency" means an
agency licensed to place children for adoption under Title 62A, Chapter 4,
Part 2
History: C. 1953, 78-30-1.1, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 245, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 245 be-

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

78-30-1.5. Legislative intent.
It is the intent and desire of the Legislature that m every adoption the best
interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court's
determination
History: C. 1953, 78-30-1 5, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 245, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 245 be-

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

78-30-2. Relative ages.
A person adopting a child must be at least ten years older than the child
adopted, unless the petitioners for adoption are a married couple, one of which
is at least ten years older than the child.
History: R.S. 1898 & C L. 1907, § 2; C.L.
1917, § 11; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 14-4-2; L.
1985, ch. 20, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Comment, The Utah
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitu
tion, 1986 Utah L Rev 319

Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am Jur 2d Adoption
§ 10
C.J.S. — 2 C J S Adoption of Persons ^ 13
Key Numbers. — Adoption <&* 4
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Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment deleted provisions relating to circuit
courts from the applicability paragraph and

Rule 4-903

the statement of the rule and substituted
"prosecuting attorney" for "county attorney" in
Subdivisions (1)(A), (2)(A), and (2)(C)

Rule 4-902. Certification of district court cases to juvenile
court.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the district court to certify questions of support,
custody or visitation to the juvenile court.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In district court cases where there is a question concerning the support,
custody or visitation of a child and a petition concerning abuse, dependency,
or neglect of the same child has been filed in juvenile court, the district court
shall certify the question of support, custody or visitation to the juvenile court
for determination.
(2) In other district court cases involving questions of support, custody or
visitation, the district court, for good cause shown, upon its own motion or the
motion of either party may certify the question of support, custody or visitation to the juvenile court for determination.
(3) A district court order certifying questions of support, custody or visitation of a child shall state whether the question is certified pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-3a-105(3) or 78-3a-105(4) When a case is certified pursuant to Section 78-3a-105(4), the certification order shall state the reason or
reasons for certification and the question or questions to be determined by the
juvenile court.
(4) When the district court certifies questions of support, custody or visitation, the clerk of the district court shall transmit the entire case file to the
clerk of the juvenile court who shall refer it to the presiding judge for assignment.
(5) When the question or questions certified to the juvenile court have been
determined by the juvenile court and the appropriate order entered, the clerk
of the juvenile court shall transmit the file to the clerk of the district court,
who shall refer it back to the judge assigned to handle the matter.
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment corrected statutory references in Subdivision (3)

Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations.
Intent:
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation of custody evaluations.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Custody evaluations shall be performed by persons with the following
minimum qualifications:
(A) Social work evaluations shall be performed by social workers licensed by the state in which they practice.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel
—Lack of due process
—Merits of case
—Mistake or inadvertence
—Mutual mistake
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.

Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof
—Divorce action
Independent action
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished
,
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.

